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Exports are often regarded as the driving force of Japanese economic
recovery in the 1930s. This paper focuses on the background of
export recovery and the effects of exchange rate depreciation on the
export expansion at that time. 
A detailed examination of the export recovery process during the
1930s reveals that the main export items and destinations changed
considerably over time. This paper attempts to verify the effects of
relative price decreases caused by exchange rate depreciation upon
export expansion for different industries, destinations, and periods.
The United States, India, and Korea are selected as destinations of
Japanese export products, namely, raw silk, cotton fabrics, and heavy
industrial and chemical products. Empirical analyses are conducted
to measure the effects of exchange rate depreciation and income effects
on exports to these different destinations. The results suggest that 
factors influencing real exports differ significantly from destination 
to destination, and that the effects of devaluation were thus not 
identical on exports to all destinations.
Key  words:  Exchange rate; Export; Gold embargo; Interwar
economyI. Introduction
In the interwar period, the Japanese economy experienced significant fluctuations;
the boom during and following the First World War, the deflationary period of the
1920s, the Great Depression in the early 1930s, and the recovery period after 1932.
These economic developments were greatly influenced by exports, as reflected in 
the following comment: “With slight exaggeration, we can summarize our findings
by saying that the growth and fluctuations of the prewar Japanese economy were
dominated by exports” (Iwami, Okazaki, and Yoshikawa [1998]).
In the midst of the Great Depression of the early 1930s, almost all national
economies experienced a serious downturn. The slowdown in the Japanese economy
was relatively mild, however, and the growth rate in real terms remained positive.
1
After 1932, while major countries remained mired in recession, the Japanese economy
began to recover. There have been numerous studies of the factors contributing to 
this early recovery. The favorable influence of exports on economic conditions is cited
in previous literature. Numerically speaking, exports consistently contributed to
expanding growth rates until the mid-1930s (Figure 1).
Japanese exchange rates declined rapidly in the first half of the 1930s due to 
the abandonment of the gold standard in December 1931. The dollar/yen rate,
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1. While the growth rate of Japan’s real GNP in 1932 was 4.4 percent over the previous year, the figure of 
real GDP growth in the United States was –14.8 percent. In the case of the United Kingdom it was 0.3 percent
compared with the previous year.
















Source: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974).which stood at US$49 per ¥100 just before the departure from the gold standard,
dropped to levels slightly higher than US$20 in December 1932, declining almost 
60 percent in a single year. The previous literature has linked this significant decline
to export recovery after 1932. Some researchers find the main cause of export growth
to be depreciating exchange rates (Nakamura [1983]), while quite a few others 
stress factors other than the exchange rate declines. Some of the latter point out 
the importance of wage reductions and enhanced labor productivity in the textile
industry, the core business sector driving exports. Others emphasize the importance
of exports to colonies and semi-colonies, linked to the expansion of Japanese political
and economic power in these regions after the Manchurian Incident in 1931
(Hashimoto [1984], Okura and Teranishi [1994], and other authors).
Exchange rates from the end of 1931 to 1932 showed the largest fluctuation in
the history of the Japanese economy, except for that recorded after the Plaza Accord
(Ito, Okina, and Teranishi [1988]). Analyses of the influences of exchange rate 
depreciation on exports during the 1930s are likely to have implications for the 
relationship between exchange rate developments and economic trends. Therefore,
this paper focuses on exports, which are generally regarded to have driven economic
recovery in the 1930s, and specifically the background of the export recovery process
and the role played by the depreciation of exchange rates in enhancing exports. 
A detailed examination of the export recovery process during the 1930s reveals that
the main export items and destinations changed considerably over time. This paper
recognizes the importance of this point and attempts to verify the effects of relative
price declines caused by exchange rate depreciation on expanding exports in different
industries, destinations, and periods.
In Section II, exchange rate trends in the 1930s and structural changes in exports
taking place during the course of the export recovery are summarized. An overall 
picture of related arguments on factors contributing to the export recovery is described
in the same section. In Section III, the effects of exchange rate depreciation on exports
are assumed to have differed by export destination, based on the fact that a relatively
small number of items (raw silk and cotton fabrics, etc.) were exported to specified 
destinations in interwar Japan. Empirical analyses of price and income effects on
exports for different destinations are conducted to verify the different effects of
exchange rate depreciation on promoting exports in terms of different industries,
export destinations, and periods. In Section IV, important factors for evaluating 
the effects of exchange rate declines on exports at the time are summarized, based on
estimates of the preceding section. Future topics for study are presented in the same
section, including price elasticity of demand for export items, exchange rate 
pass-through (the extent of changes in local currency-denominated sales prices against
changes in exchange rates), wage decreases, improvements in labor productivity, and
the effects of increased raw material prices due to yen depreciation. In the appendixes,
some points to be noted in this analysis in the treatment of colonies and semi-colonies,
trends in global trade restrictions from the 1920s through the 1930s, and various 
statistics used to estimate export functions are summarized.
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A. Exchange Rate Developments
In the first half of the 1930s, the Japanese currency regime changed from the gold
standard to the managed currency system, and exchange rates fluctuated significantly
during this period (Figure 2). During the First World War, the United States and
major European countries had suspended the gold standard. Then, in the 1920s, the
gold standard system was almost completely restored internationally, with a return to
the system by major developed countries.
2 Japan also returned to the gold standard 
at prewar parity (US$49.845 per ¥100; hereafter, unless otherwise specified, the
exchange rate is shown in U.S. dollar value per ¥100), in January 1930, a little later
than other countries. However, the Japanese gold standard remained in effect for 
less than two years. Due to massive yen sales triggered by the United Kingdom’s
abandonment of the gold standard in September 1931, Japan reinforced the gold
embargo in December 1931 and departed from the gold standard.
3 The exchange
rate at the time temporarily plummeted from parity, US$49.845, to below US$20 in
November 1932.
The government initially accepted this sharp decline as part of its “exchange 
rate laissez-faire” policy. However, after the yen dipped below US$20 in 1932 the
government changed its stance to exchange rate stabilization (Ito [1982]).
4 Several
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Source: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters (annual editions).
2. Temin (1989) describes the detailed process of the recovery and collapse of the gold standard in this period.
3. The reimposition of the gold embargo in 1931 meant the de facto abandonment of the gold standard. The
Coinage Act, which was the legal foundation for the gold standard in Japan, was not abolished but suspended for
its implementation. However, it never became effective again.
4. The initial purpose of abandoning the gold standard is controversial. One view is that the government intended to
stimulate exports by stabilizing exchange rates at lower levels (Shima [1983] and Nanto and Takagi [1985]).
Others argue that the abandonment of the gold standard was not implemented as the export drive. For example,instruments were introduced to achieve the exchange rate stabilization policy, 
including the Capital Flight Prevention Law
5 enacted in July 1932 and the Foreign
Exchange Control Law enacted in May 1933. In addition, the United States 
abandoned the gold standard in October 1933, weakening the sales pressure on the
yen against the dollar. Following 1933, the exchange rate stabilized at low levels.
6
B. Export Trends
From the late 1920s to the early 1930s, tight economic policies targeting the return
to the gold standard at prewar parity were enacted. These policies are occasionally
referred to as the Inoue Economic Policy, after the Finance Minister at that time,
Junnosuke Inoue. As the return to the gold standard actually went into effect in the
midst of the Great Depression, the Japanese economy slowed in the early 1930s. In
1930 and 1931, nominal exports dropped by over 20 percent from the previous year,
primarily because yen-denominated export prices plunged dramatically (Figures 3
and 4).
7 Textile products were the major export items at that time, and the decline in
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analyzing daily exchange rates from 1932 through 1933, Ito, Okina, and Teranishi (1988) state that the exchange
rate decline in 1932 was primarily caused by sales by overseas traders who were concerned about the Manchurian
Incident and the subsequent isolation of Japan in the international community. They negate the governmental 
initiative of a currency devaluation policy designed to promote exports.
5. It has frequently been pointed out that the Capital Flight Prevention Law had many loopholes and was ineffective
(Hashimoto [1984] and other authors).
6. In discussions of the causes of the collapse of the gold standard, one of the important issues often raised is whether
the parity of each country diverged from its equilibrium rate. A prevailing notion is that exchange rates in 
the 1920s in Japan were overvalued (Okura and Teranishi [1994], Hashimoto [1984], and other authors). For 
the 1930s, views are divided between that of “more or less in equilibrium” (Okura and Teranishi [1994]) and
“developing below purchasing power parity” (Hashimoto [1984]).
7. Due to the worldwide Great Depression, the prices of Japan’s main export items, such as raw silk and cotton yarn,
declined sharply in the international market. These sluggish market conditions led to the decline of the yen-
denominated export prices of these products, and yen-denominated export prices in Japan thus dropped by about
40 percent in the two years from 1929 to 1931.
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Source: Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978).prices in this sector, particularly for raw silk bound for the United States, contributed
to the decline in the total export price. Although real export figures declined slightly
in both 1930 and 1931 compared to previous years, the extent of this decline was less
severe than that of the nominal base (Figure 3).
Finance Minster Korekiyo Takahashi, who had taken office at the end of 
1931, implemented a series of policies, including enforcement of the gold embargo,
commonly referred to as the Takahashi Economic Policy. Partly as a result of these
policies, signs of economic recovery appeared following 1932. Meanwhile, nominal
exports recovered rapidly, as indicated by an increase of over 20 percent in 1932 from
the previous year. This was followed by annual increases at an average of 10 percent
until 1937, although minor fluctuations did occur. Export prices during this period
first leveled off in 1932, increased in 1933, then remained flat until 1936, before
turning upward after 1937 (Figures 3 and 4).
C. Export Recovery and Trade Structure
Trade in Japan around the 1930s primarily involved imports of raw materials and
exports of relatively limited items, mainly textile products. Textile products, such as
cotton fabrics and raw silk, accounted for about 50 percent of all exports in 1935.
Heavy industrial and chemical products were also major export items. Chemical
products, metal products, and machinery each accounted for about 10 percent of all
exports (Figures 5 and 6). 
In the meantime, from the 1920s through the 1930s, the trade structure underwent
drastic change (Figures 5 and 6).
8 In the 1920s, textile materials were imported, and
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Source: Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978).
8. For information on the details of changes in Japanese trade structure from the 1920s through the 1930s, see Ito
(1982) and Hashimoto (1984).149
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Source: Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978).
9. In the analyses of Japanese exports prior to the Second World War, one controversial issue is whether colonies and
semi-colonies should be treated as domestic or as equal to foreign countries. This paper treats them as equal to 
foreign countries. For more detailed explanations of this issue, see Appendix 1.
raw silk, cotton yarns, and other textile-related materials were exported. In the 1930s,
textile materials, such as cotton, were imported, and more highly processed textile
products, such as cotton fabrics, and other kinds of fabrics, were exported. At the same
time, raw fuel materials were imported and exports of heavy industrial and chemical
products picked up, primarily to colonies and semi-colonies.
9 Different demand 
locations existed for different export products, and as export item structure changed,
the export destination structure changed as well.150 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002






















Source: Yukizawa and Maeda (1978).
From 1932 through 1934, Japanese exports experienced a recovery led by the 
textile industry. As mentioned earlier, unlike the 1920s, when raw silk and cotton
yarns played central roles,
10 export expansions from 1932 through 1934 were 
mainly led by fabrics and chemical textiles. According to Hashimoto (1984), three 
sectors in the textile industry led the expansion of exports in this period, namely 
the cotton industry importing cotton and exporting cotton fabrics, the rayon 
industry importing pulp and exporting rayon filament yarns and fabrics, and the
10. In the 1930s, exports of raw silk to the United States declined due to the Great Depression and the invention of
nylon and other synthetic fiber products, which began to replace silk items (Yukizawa and Maeda [1978] and
Blumenthal [1981]).wool industry importing woolen yarn and exporting woolen fabrics.
11 While raw silk,
a primary export item in the 1920s, was mainly exported to industrialized countries
such as the United States, cotton fabrics, which grew to be the biggest export item
after 1932, were primarily exported to Asian countries, such as India. Against this
background, exports to India and other Asian countries increased significantly in the
first half of the 1930s (Figures 7 and 8).
12,13
Increasing exports of textile products, primarily of woven products, intensified
competition with the United Kingdom, which had dominant shares in textile product
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Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978).
11. While the proportion of yarns to total textile export dropped from 57 percent in 1925 to 27 percent in 1935, the
proportion of woven products increased from 35 percent to 51 percent in the same period.
12. The country-by-country figures cited here are based on data found in Kin’yu Jiko Sanko-Sho (Reference Book of
Financial Matters) issued annually by the Financial Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. The sources of statistics
referenced in this paper are Reference Book of Financial Matters, Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics
(hereafter referred to as LTES) 14 estimated by Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978), and trade statistics compiled
by Yukizawa and Maeda (Yukizawa and Maeda [1978], hereafter referred to as “Yukizawa/Maeda statistics”). As
for Japanese trade data, complete enumerative surveys by the Ministry of Finance have been compiled since quite
early times, as Gaikoku Boeki Nenpyo (Annual Returns of Foreign Trade of Japan), and almost all statistical 
data contained in this paper are based on these. However, since the Reference Book of Financial Matters is 
compiled in accordance with prewar criteria, the handling of colonies and other matters differ somewhat from
those compiled after the Second World War. In the LTES, annual long-term chronological data are compiled 
on exports by destination and by industry. In the Yukizawa/Maeda statistics, export values of detailed items for
different locations are summarized for every five years.
13. It should be noted that exports to Korea and Taiwan are excluded from data in the Reference Book of Financial
Matters. The export value to Asia referred to here is the sum of the figure for Asia from the Reference Book of
Financial Matters, and export values to Korea and Taiwan from the LTES. While Japanese trade statistics are FOB-
based, exports to Korea and Taiwan are compiled on a CIF basis. In the adjustment method adopted here, exports
to Korea and Taiwan are quite probably overestimated, compared to those for other trade destinations (Yukizawa
and Maeda [1978] consider the overestimate for exports to Korea and Taiwan to be around 5–10 percent).markets around the globe. As the textile industries of Japan and the United Kingdom
had roughly identical export destinations (China, India, Hong Kong, the Dutch
Indies, and the Straits Settlements), and also had similar product structures, mainly
consisting of cotton and woolen fabrics, there was severe competition between the 
two countries (Hashimoto [1984]). British exports of textile products had already
decreased in the latter half of the 1920s, partly due to Great Britain’s return to the 
gold standard in 1925 at prewar parity.
14 In the 1930s, as overall demand around 
the world declined due to the Great Depression, British exports of cotton products
experienced significant declines. However, Japan’s exports of cotton products increased
dramatically after 1932. As a result, by 1933, the cotton fabric export positions of
Japan and the United Kingdom had been reversed (Figure 9).
15
Rapid expansion of Japanese product shares in the international textile product
markets grew to be a political problem in the United Kingdom and its colonies, such
as India. The tension between Japan and the British Empire induced tariff escalation
and the enforcement of import quotas, designed to protect British and colonial
industries. Specifically, after the Ottawa Conference of the United Kingdom and its
colonial states in July to August 1932, while preferential treatment was recognized 
for the United Kingdom and its colonies, movements to raise tariffs against other
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Sources: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters (annual editions);
Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978).
14. The development of cotton industries in India and China also caused the shrinkage of the United Kingdom’s
share in the global textile market at that time (Sharkey [2001]).
15. The company history of Kurashiki Boseki Kabushiki Gaisha (Kurabo Industries Ltd.) describes the condition of
the global cotton fabric market at that time as “split by the Japanese and British, with fierce competition between
East and West” (Kurashiki Boseki Kabushiki Gaisha [1953]).countries, including Japan, or to impose import quotas, intensified.
16,17 (For more
details on trade restrictions from the 1920s through the 1930s, see Appendix 2.) 
Under these circumstances, textile product exports to Asia peaked after 1935,
while those to new markets such as Africa and South America began to grow.
However, the increased exports to these new markets were not enough to offset 
losses in exports to the major markets. Textile export increases thus slowed in the
mid-1930s, with the growth of total exports decelerating as well.
From the mid-1930s toward the end of the decade, exports to Japan’s colonies and
semi-colonies became the driving forces of export expansion (Figures 7 and 8).
18,19
The enhanced trade restrictions mentioned above led to a shift in export destinations. 
In addition, with increased military expansion into mainland China taking place
after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, investments in colonies and semi-colonies
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16. For example, India maintained a tariff for cotton fabrics against the United Kingdom at 25 percent, but raised
the same to 75 percent against other countries, including Japan. Considering the high ratio of Japanese products
in Indian cotton fabric imports at the time, this trade restriction measure could be regarded as targeting Japanese
products. These trade restraints expanded to other countries, such as Canada and Australia, and “by 1936
Japanese cotton fabric exports were restricted in 78 of 128 markets” (Hashimoto [1984]).
17. The purpose of the preferential tariff bloc of the British Empire established after the Ottawa conference has
recently been interpreted as intended “to promote export expansion of primary products from colonies, rather
than that of products from the British mainland” (Akita and Kagotani [2001]). For more details, see Kagotani
(2001) and Sugihara (2001). For views emphasizing the promotion of British exports to its colonies, see
Yanagisawa (2001).
18. As a result, exports to Asia accounted for 60 percent of total exports in the mid-1930s.
19. In the latter half of the 1930s, exports to China increased. The figures for exports to China, available in Reference
Book of Financial Matters and adopted here, include those to Kwantung Province, a territory leased to Japan.
According to Yamamoto (1989), the majority of exports to Kwantung Province were re-exported to Manchuria
and North China, except for a small portion consumed in the province itself.
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Note: The British figures are converted from yards into square yards with a conver-
sion ratio obtained from the export quantity in 1920 (4,643 million yards =
4,435 million square yards).
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters (annual editions);
Mitchell (1988).accelerated (Ito [1982] and Hashimoto [1984]).
20 These investments in colonies and
semi-colonies after 1932 were an important factor contributing to increased exports
to these regions. As Hashimoto (1984) points out, “Investments in Manchuria were
the driving force of the export expansion to that region.” Increases in exports of
heavy industrial and chemical products were most noteworthy in these areas.
21
As observed above, Japan’s exports in the 1930s maintained relatively high levels
of growth,
22 while trade structures changed with the passage of time. Since the 
characteristics of exports changed in different periods, the 1930s is hereafter divided
into four periods for the analysis of the causes of export expansion based on different
export patterns. The first period is 1930–31, in which nominal exports plummeted
due to price declines. The second period is 1932–34, in which exports expanded
with textile products (primarily cotton fabrics) for developing countries. The third
period is 1935–36, in which the growth of textile exports peaked due to enhanced
trade restrictions and other factors, making the entire export growth level sluggish.
Finally, the fourth period is after 1937, when exports became more dependent on
colonies and semi-colonies.
D. Factors Promoting Exports
There have been many studies of factors contributing to the rapid improvements in
exports in and after 1932, but opinions diverge on the extent to which lower relative
prices of export products, led by exchange rate declines, affected the recovery of
exports. Some scholars emphasize the contribution of lowered relative prices of
export products brought about by exchange rate depreciation. Others recognize the
effects of exchange rate declines, but simultaneously emphasize other factors.
23 Of the
latter, many stress factors that helped cap yen-denominated export prices, specifically,
the roles of (1) wage reductions and (2) improved labor productivity brought 
by streamlining and technological innovations. Furthermore, in addition to price 
factors, many emphasize (3) the contribution of increasing exports to colonies 
and semi-colonies to the overall export expansion. (For the main issues raised in the
previous literature, see Table 1.)
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20. Hashimoto (1984) states that the scale of the investment in Manchuria was about ¥1.1–1.2 billion for five years
from 1932 through 1936. Assuming that about ¥200 million was invested annually, the figure represents about 
1 percent to 2 percent of the GNP of mainland Japan at that time.
21. In the 1930s, domestic products gradually replaced imported products in heavy and chemical industries. In this
field, however, the quality of domestic products appeared to have been inadequate to compete in the world 
market with products from more industrialized countries. For example, Okura and Teranishi (1994) contend
that increased exports of heavy industrial and chemical products to colonies and semi-colonies did not reflect the
technical superiority of Japan. They point out that even after the domestic production ratios had increased in the
machinery industry, heavy machinery, particularly larger and more sophisticated models, continued to be
imported from Western countries, with domestic production limited to smaller and less sophisticated models.
Thus, the destinations of export expansion in the heavy industrial and chemical products were limited to colonies
and semi-colonies, since exports to those destinations were mainly accompanied by investment activity.
22. In Japan, exports recovered faster in the 1930s than in other major countries. For example, in 1933 yen-
denominated nominal exports from Japan had already returned to 1930 levels, while the United States and
United Kingdom did not return to that level until 1940 and 1946, respectively.
23. Another view argues that the exchange rate declines had very limited influence over increases in export 
volume. Takagi (1989) conducts a time-series analysis on the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on industrial
production, exports, and imports from the latter half of the 1920s through the first half of the 1930s, and states
that real exchange rates had very limited influence over the figures converted into real terms by the wholesale
price index (WPI).Nakamura (1983) and Patrick (1971) emphasize the role of decline in relative
prices of export items caused by exchange rate depreciation. Nakamura (1983) argues
that the major cause of export increases was the depreciation of exchange rates, 
stating that “Japan was almost alone in seeing exports increase; this would have been
difficult during the world depression without a drastic devaluation of more than 
40 percent.” Patrick (1971) also comments, “Japanese export prices had dropped to
comparatively low levels, and (in 1933) exports had risen to 38 percent above the
1928 level.”
However, many previous studies mention other factors besides depreciation of
exchange rates as the cause of export growth in the 1930s. While many of these 
studies recognize the influence of the lowered exchange rate over exports, they regard
these influences as rather limited compared to the first view.
It is frequently pointed out that wage declines, especially in the textile industry,
reduced production costs and even yen-denominated product prices, supporting
exports. For example, Hashimoto (1984) comments that export prices of cotton 
fabrics in Japan were capped by wage reduction. While wages in the United Kingdom,
Japan’s chief competitor, showed downward rigidity, wages in Japan declined 
significantly in the 1930s, helping to reduce production costs of cotton fabrics in Japan
to levels 17–18 percent lower than the United Kingdom. Hashimoto (1984) thus 
concludes, “Declines in both exchange rates and wages were the supporting factors 
for Japan’s cotton industry advance in the world.”
24,25 In fact, comparing nominal 
wages in the cotton industries of both the United Kingdom and Japan, while wage 
levels in the United Kingdom in 1934 dipped slightly, to 9 percent below the 1930
level, Japanese wages dropped by 29 percent in the same period (Figure 10).
26
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24. According to Hashimoto (1984), wages in Japan consistently declined during the first half of the 1930s before
finally seeming to bottom out in 1936; in particular, wage reductions for female workers in the textile industry
were conspicuous. Although the speed of the decline was moderate, the actual decline from the beginning to the
middle of the 1930s was among the steepest in the world, comparable only to the decline in Germany.
25. In the early 1930s, domestic textile companies implemented major streamlining measures, such as closure of
unprofitable operations and workforce reductions, in addition to wage cuts. For example, the company history of
Kurashiki Boseki Kabushiki Gaisha (Kurabo Industries Ltd.) indicates implementation of labor reductions twice
in the latter half of 1930 and in 1931. As a result, employee numbers were reduced by 25 percent (Kurashiki
Boseki Kabushiki Gaisha [1953]).
26. The rapid expansion of exports of Japanese products supported by these low labor costs was perceived in the
United Kingdom as the result of “social dumping,” a strategy whereby export industries apply unfair low wages in
order to maintain their competitiveness. This view may have been used as the justification for the imposition of
the subsequent trade restrictions. For more details on this issue, see Takahashi (1950). Similar arguments were
Table 1  Major Export Recovery Factors Presented in the Previous Literature
Price factors Non-price factors
Exchange rate 
Improved labor productivity 
Increased exports to 
depreciation
Wage reduction due to streamlining and
colonies and semi-colonies technological innovation
Nakamura (1983) Hashimoto (1984) Napier (1981) Okura and Teranishi (1994) 
Patrick (1971) Lewis (1949) Ito (1982) (After the middle of the 1930s)
Okura and Teranishi (1994) Hashimoto (1984) Iwami, Okazaki, and Yoshikawa
(From 1932 to 1933) Sharkey (2001) (1998)Furthermore, Lewis (1949) points out that more flexible price structures than those
in other countries, including those for wages, helped alleviate Japan’s production
declines during the Great Depression.
It is also frequently pointed out that improved labor productivity due to 
streamlining and technological innovations contributed to cap yen-denominated
export prices, thus leading to export expansion. During and after the 1920s, the
Japanese cotton industry improved labor productivity significantly by introducing
new technologies and large-scale capital investments.
27 Ito (1982) suggests that 
this upward trend in labor productivity continued in the 1930s. In fact, labor 
productivity in the cotton-spinning industry, as measured by total labor input, 
156 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002
also presented in Japan after the Second World War. For example, concerning the increased export figures in 
cotton fabrics, Nakanishi (1968) comments, “The expansion of cotton fabric exports was caused by the use of 
so-called foreign exchange dumping as an export promotion tool.” This “so-called foreign exchange dumping” 
is not clearly defined, but by quoting a comment by a textile company executive at the time (“Profits can be 
generated by squeezing and reducing costs of labor”), it may be seen to refer to wage reductions implemented
simultaneously with exchange rate declines. On this account, more detailed analyses will be required, such as
analyses of the cost structures of the cotton industry and comparisons with similar industries in other countries.
27. In the 1920s, high-draft machines entered wide use, contributing to significant process reductions in the 
spinning industry. In addition, for woven fabrics, new technologies were rapidly introduced for labor savings,
such as the Toyota automatic looms invented in 1924. Furthermore, large-scale investments were also made to
prepare for the elimination of late-night work by female and minor workers, which was to be implemented 
in 1929 (Hashimoto [1982, 1984], Sharkey [2001]). Simultaneously, air-conditioning facilities were improved
and installed to adjust temperature and humidity to enable cotton yarn to be made stronger, and to allow 
sophisticated equipment to operate properly (Abe [1995]).
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Japan
United Kingdom
Note: For the United Kingdom, wages in the cotton industry. For Japan, wages of
female cotton spinners and female cotton weavers are aggregated with weights
obtained from production values of cotton yarns and fabrics in 1935.
Sources: Mitchell (1988); Ohkawa et al. (1967); Ono, Fujino, and Fujino (1979).significantly increased in the first half of the 1930s (Figure 11). In this regard, Abe
(1995) points out the possibility that the new trend of introducing new and powerful
machines in small to medium-sized enterprises, as well as newly constructed factories,
subsequently spread to major spinning companies and greatly improved labor 
productivity in the first half of the 1930s.
28
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The contribution of increased exports to colonies and semi-colonies to recovery in
the entire export sector has also frequently been pointed out (Okura and Teranishi
[1994] and Iwami, Okazaki, and Yoshikawa [1998]). Several factors are believed to
have existed that particularly affected trade with colonies and semi-colonies, and
these factors must be taken into account when analyzing trade with these regions, 
in addition to those affecting foreign trade. These particular factors can be either 
economic (such as tariffs and currencies) or political (such as colonial policies).
During these periods, such factors helped promote Japan’s trade with its colonies 
and semi-colonies. For example, tariffs were lifted for trade between Japan and its
colonies in both directions.
29 And, as mentioned above, investments in colonies and
semi-colonies greatly increased during the Japanese military encroachment into
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Note: Labor productivity is real production value divided by total labor input.
Source: Ono, Fujino, and Fujino (1979).
28. It is also pointed out that the closure of inefficient factories, implemented in 1929–30 in some sectors, helped
improve productivity at that time (Napier [1981]).
29. Colonization did not immediately lead to tariff exemptions, since tariff exemptions with colonies and semi-
colonies were implemented at different times, depending on government policies. For more details on this point,
see Appendix 1.China in the 1930s.
30 (For differences in colonies and semi-colonies in terms of legal
status and economic systems and the precautions reflecting these differences in
implementing analyses, see Appendix 1.) Okura and Teranishi (1994) comment that
Japan’s export growth in the 1930s, unlike that in European countries during the
same period,
31 cannot be totally explained by declining exchange rates. According to
their empirical analysis, although the impact of exchange rate depreciation was signif-
icant in the early stages (specifically 1932 and 1933), this impact subsequently and 
rapidly diminished. They conclude that the effects of Japan’s political and economic
expansion into colonies and semi-colonies on export increases cannot be denied.
32
To some extent, the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on exports depend on the
price elasticity of demand for export items. In this regard, Sato (1978) measures the
income elasticity and the price elasticity of demand for raw silk, a major export 
product in the 1920s through the 1930s, in the United States, the largest export 
destination for this product. Sato (1978) concludes that with income elasticity at 
3.5 and the price elasticity at –0.3, demand for raw silk was significantly susceptible
to income factors. Sato (1981) also estimates the price elasticity of cotton product
demand at “roughly –2 to –3.”
III. Empirical Analysis of Exports by Destination
A. Objectives and Methods for Estimating Export Functions 
for Different Destinations
As noted in the previous section, Japan’s overall exports continued to increase relatively
rapidly throughout the 1930s. A breakdown analysis of these exports indicates that 
the items and destinations that recorded significant increases changed over time.
Despite the existence of empirical analyses of Japan’s total exports and case studies on
individual export items, studies summarizing the effects of exchange rate fluctuations
for different export destinations seem to be rare. Based on the export structure at 
the time, in which specific items were exported to specific destinations, breakdown
analyses for export destinations should present more detailed explanations of the 
relationship between exchange rates and exports. This section will therefore analyze
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30. The previous literature frequently points out that export expansions dependent on colonies and semi-colonies
faced limitations in terms of cash flows of foreign currencies (Nakamura [1983], Ito [1982], and other authors).
While exports to colonies and semi-colonies at that time were mainly comprised of heavy industrial and chemical
products, raw materials for these products must have been imported from regions other than colonies or semi-
colonies. Since these colonies and semi-colonies were in the yen bloc, increased exports to these regions did not
contribute to foreign exchange earnings; however, imports from outside regions required foreign currencies.
Thus, after 1937, while trade surpluses were recorded for mainland Japan, it was difficult for foreign currency
flows to cover trade deficits against industrialized countries.
31. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) estimate the effects of exchange rate reductions in the 1930s on European
economies and report a correlation between exchange rates and exports; that is, the lower the exchange rate, the
more exports the country can expect.
32. Okura and Teranishi (1994) state that the performance of the export function with the “East Asian dummy”
variable comprised of export quantities for colonies and semi-colonies is better than that without the dummy
variable. (Other explanatory variables common for those two estimates are import quantity indexes of major
Japanese export destinations, as a proxy variable for income factor, and the relative export prices of Japan as price
factors.) They thus conclude that export expansion to colonies and semi-colonies became an important factor in
increasing exports throughout the 1930s.export functions for various destinations (the United States, India, and Korea) in order
to specify factors, which affected exports to each destination.
The purpose of empirical analysis here is to conduct comparative studies on 
the effects of three factors on export increases for each destination. These factors 
are (1) exchange rates, (2) income factors of destination countries/regions, and 
(3) enhanced colonial policies, including increased investment in Japan’s colonies and
semi-colonies. In this estimate, real exports are treated as dependent variables, and
real exchange rates, real GDP, and direct investments from Japan are treated as
explanatory variables.
First, in the estimation of total real exports (excluding figures for China and
Manchuria),
33,34 the real effective exchange rate and the real GDP for the world are
treated as explanatory variables. The real effective exchange rate is compiled by an
export value-based weighting system.
35 (For real exports and the real effective
exchange rate, refer to Figure 12.) The real GDP for the world consists of the GDPs
of major countries and regions with an export value-based weighting system.
36 For
real effective exchange rates, the figures for the current and previous terms are both
made explanatory variables, considering the time lag after which exchange rate 
fluctuations affect trade volume. The sample period is 1914–37, a period during
which nominal exchange rates and real GDP figures for each country or region are
available. For all data, annual figures are transformed into indexes established by 
setting the 1934–36 average as 100, logarithms of which are utilized.
Next, export functions of major destination countries and regions, representing
destinations of major export items at the time, are estimated. The major Japanese
export items at the time were raw silk, cotton products, and heavy industrial and
chemical products. In the three regions of study, the United States was the biggest
export partner for raw silk.
37 India was an important export destination for cotton
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33. From the 1920s through the 1930s, China, including Manchuria, was an important export destination for Japan,
accounting for 10–20 percent of total Japanese exports. However, exports to China (including Manchuria from
1931) are excluded from the dependent variables in this analysis, due to the insufficient data. Chinese real GDP
figures are available from 1929 in Madison (2000), but are insufficient to conduct estimates using the data set
from 1910. For other countries, there are countries and regions in which long-term chronological data concern-
ing real GDP are not available (Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, and other regions). Exports to these countries
and regions are not excluded from the dependent variables, since they raise no serious problems, being regarded
as minor in terms of export values.
34. The export price indexes of table 5 in the LTES 14 are utilized to convert export values into real terms.
35. Real effective exchange rates are compiled from real exchange rates for nine regions from which continuous 
nominal exchange rates and price index data are available, and which were among the top 20 destinations of
Japan’s exports in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s. For details of the calculation methods, see Appendix 3. 
As stated by Sugihara (2001), the scope of previous literature analyzing real effective exchange rates has been
limited to the United States and the United Kingdom. In this regard, in Iwami, Okazaki, and Yoshikawa (1998),
the analytical scope is expanded to include India and China. 
As represented by Madison (2000), since more substantial long-term chronological data from each country
have recently become available, it is expected that the scope of analysis will be expanded. As for nominal
exchange rates for China, Sugihara (2001) conducts analyses that incorporate the effects of the monetary regime
reform of China in the 1930s.
36. Real GDP for the world is compiled from data for the regions from which continuous real GDP data are 
available, and which were among the top 20 of Japan’s export destinations in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s. For
details of the calculation methods, see Appendix 3.
37. The proportion of raw silk exports to total exports to the United States remained at 62 percent in 1935, 
although it decreased year by year, due to the Great Depression and the emergence of substitute products such as
synthetic fibers.products and a typical example of increasing exports, primarily of cotton products in
the second period (1932–34), while Korea was a typical example of a colonial or
semi-colonial export destination.
38
In all these cases, the data are on an annual basis, and the sample period is
1912–37, a period in which horizontal comparisons of the three regions can be
made. (For real exports and real exchange rates for the United States, India, and
Korea, refer to Figures 13, 14, and 15.) The dependent variables are real exports for
each country or region. In the case of the United States and India, the explanatory
variables are real exchange rates against the currencies of the destination countries,
39
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38. The scales and the growth rates of investments in the 1930s from Japan were more significant in Manchuria 
than in Korea. For Manchuria, chronological data became available only after 1932, when “Manchukuo” was
established. The analysis here thus involves Korea as its data are comparable with those available from the other
countries, and since its situation was similar to that in Manchuria, where increased investment from Japan 
followed colonial policy changes. This investment, as in Manchuria, was particularly evident in the heavy and
chemical industries in the 1930s.
Korea experienced rapid industrialization in the 1930s. This may be attributed to the fact that the status of
Korea in Japan’s colonial policies changed from being a food supply base to a base for supplying basic materials
required for heavy and chemical industries (Yamamoto [1992]). This industrialization policy in Korea, as in 
that of Manchuria, quite probably induced exports of heavy industrial and chemical products from Japan. 
For example, in the case of facilities of the Konan Factory of Chosen Chisso Kabushiki Gaisha, which was a 
manufacturer of chemical products and invested significant amounts in Korea among Japanese-affiliated private
enterprises, “all the necessary facilities and equipment were ordered to Japanese manufacturers” (Nihon Chisso
Hiryo Kabushiki Gaisha [1937]).
39. Currencies used for settlement of these exports to the United States and India were not necessarily the currencies
of the destination countries. However, if the yen depreciates against the currencies of the destination countries,
Figure 12  Real Exports to the World (Excluding China and Manchuria) 
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Note: For the calculation methods of the real effective exchange rates and
real exports, see Footnotes 34 and 35, and Appendix 3.
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters (annual
editions); Ohkawa et al. (1967); Yamazawa and Yamamoto
(1978); Japan Statistical Association (1988); Madison (2000);
Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking 
and Monetary Statistics, 1943.161
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Sources: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters
(annual editions); Ohkawa et al. (1967); U.S. Department of
Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1989.
Figure 14   Real Exports to India and Real Exchange Rate against the Rupee
Real exports
Real exchange rate
















Sources: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters
(annual editions); Ohkawa et al. (1967); Mitchell (1998).
the relative prices of the goods exported from Japan decline in those currencies, and this should affect an increase
in export quantities for Japan. Thus, real exchange rates against the currencies of the destination countries are
used as explanatory variables. According to Ito (1979), prior to the First World War, Japanese trade settlements
were mostly made on the basis of the pound sterling (even raw silk exports to the United States were settled 
in London on a pound sterling basis), but after the 1920s the settlement currencies diversified into pounds, U.S.
dollars, yen, and silver.162 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002
and the real GDP of the destination countries as income factors. For Korea, besides
an estimate with real exchange rates and real GDP as explanatory variables, two 
additional estimates are conducted; with real GDP and real direct investments 
as explanatory variables, and with real GDP and lagged dependent variables as
explanatory variables.
40 Real exchange rates for both the current and previous terms
are treated as explanatory variables, considering the time lag after which exchange
rate fluctuations affect trade volume. For India, the First World War dummy 
variable is also added to estimates between 1914–18, as exports to India during this
period jumped temporarily due to the United Kingdom’s participation in the First
World War.
41,42
All data are derived from annual figures transformed into indexes with the average
of 1934 to 1936 set to 100. For real exports, the nominal export values for each
country or region are converted into indexes, which are further deflated by export
Figure 15  Real Exports to Korea and Real Exchange Rate 
Real exports
Real exchange rate
















Sources: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters
(annual editions); Ohkawa et al. (1967); Government-General
of Korea, Statistical Yearbook of the Government-General
of Korea (annual editions); Mizoguchi, Toshiyuki, and Mataji
Umemura, Kyu-Nihon Shokuminchi Keizai Tokei: Suikei
to Bunseki (Basic Economic Statistics of Former Japanese
Colonies 1895–1938: Estimates and Findings), 1988. 
40. At that time, a currency linked to the Japanese yen was used in Korea (see Appendix 1), and no nominal
exchange rate fluctuations took place between these two currencies. If there are gaps in two countries’ domestic
price developments, real exchange rates may fluctuate, even under a fixed exchange rate system. Therefore, the
real exchange rates against Korea are also treated as explanatory variables. As for direct investments, security 
and business investments from Japan in Korea, obtained from table 20 of the LTES 14 (Korean receipt and 
payment against Japan mainland) are utilized. These amounts are equivalent to the sum of direct investments and
securities investments under the current framework for balance of payments.
41. Prior to the First World War, the Indian cotton product market was dominated by British products. However, a
“cutting off of the supply” (Nakanishi [1968]) took place due to the war, leading to increased exports of Japanese
cotton yarns to India.
42. For comparison, estimates are also made by adding the First World War dummy variable to the export functions
for the world, the United States, and Korea. The results are insignificant, however.price indexes for each country or region, after which the resulting indexes are 
transformed into logarithms. The export price indexes for each country or region are
basically estimated with the Export Price Indexes Classified by Industry, available 
in table 5 of the Long-Term Economic Statistics (hereafter referred to as LTES ) 14.
However, these indexes are export prices for the entire world and are unable to reflect
structural differences in exports for different destinations in terms of textile products
comprising the majority of exports. They are therefore adjusted on the basis of the
export prices of major textile items.
43 Exchange rates are changed into real terms by
utilizing wholesale price indexes of Japan and the United States for the United States.
For India and Korea, retail price indexes of India and Korea, together with Japanese
wholesale price indexes, are used due to the lack of availability of wholesale prices.
44
Japanese direct investments in Korea are converted into real terms by utilizing
Japanese wholesale price indexes.
B. Estimated Results of Export Functions for Different Destinations 
and Their Interpretations
The estimated results are as indicated in Table 2. The effects of each factor on exports
suggest significant differences for each export destination. First, for real exports to 
the entire world, the coefficients of the real effective exchange rates for both the 
current and previous terms are significant, the coefficients being slightly greater for
the previous term. The coefficient of the real GDP, as an income factor, also turns
out to be significant. Given these results, it may be surmised that significant
exchange rate depreciations supported real exports in the second period (1932–34)
under conditions in which the real GDP for the world declined.
Next, the U.S. real GDP turns out to be greater than the real exchange rates in
terms of both the coefficient and t-value. Specifically, the coefficient of the real
exchange rate for the previous term is insignificant.
45 On the other hand, in India, 
the coefficient of the real exchange rate is significant only for the previous term, 
and the coefficient of the real GDP is negative (meaning that when real GDP
increases, exports decrease). The coefficient of the real exchange rate during the term
in which it is significant is greater for India than for the world or the United States.
For Korea, the coefficients of the real exchange rate for the previous term and the real
GDP turn out to be significant. When real GDP and real direct investment in Korea
from Japan are made explanatory variables, the coefficients of both turn out to 
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43. Export price indexes for different countries or regions are basically estimated by utilizing price indexes by 
industry in table 5 of the LTES 14, except textiles. As for textiles, the price index is compiled from export prices
for major textile items. The weights are calculated using classified export values for each country or region given
in the Yukizawa/Maeda statistics. For more details on the calculations and the reasons for adjustments for textile
products, see Appendix 3.
44. Mitchell (1998) has been used for retail price indexes in India. Figures for 1912–13 and 1915–20 are 
unavailable, and therefore, linear interpolations are conducted on the assumption that the rates of change were
consistent from 1914 to 1921.
45. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the serial correlation in the estimates for the United States, and final judg-
ment should be reserved when interpreting the results. Lagged dependent variables are added as explanatory 
variables to eliminate correlation, and while coefficient signs produce the same results for exchange rates in both
the current and previous terms, the coefficients of these variables are insignificant. At the same time, the coefficient
of real GDP is significant. However, Durbin’s h statistic of –2.56 implies that correlation may not have been 
completely eliminated. These estimates will therefore require further study in order to draw any strong conclusions.164 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002
Table 2  Estimated Results of Export Functions for Different Destinations
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
Real 




























1 2.22 –0.80 –1.09 2.39 — — — 0.95 1.52
(1.65) (–2.24)* (–3.04)** (15.79)**
United –1.87 –0.97 0.16 2.20 — — — 0.72 1.03
States (–1.08) (–2.08)* (0.34) (7.80)**
India
34.23 –0.08 –3.24 –3.17 — –0.77 — 0.76 1.56
(3.35) (–0.12) (–5.48)** (–1.77)* (–4.37)**
Korea (1)
2.36 –0.92 –1.85 3.19 — — — 0.93 1.01
(1.12) (–1.31) (–2.66)** (18.13)**
Korea (2)
–8.25 — — 2.52 0.21 — — 0.87 1.15
(–6.99) (8.12)** (2.93)**
Korea (3)
–2.05 — — 0.60 — — 0.87 0.98 0.82 (#)
(–2.29) (2.34)* (11.68)**
Notes: 1. Excluding China and Manchuria.
2. World figures are calculated using exchange rates for the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, India, Taiwan, and Korea, for which nominal exchange rates are continuously available 
and which were among Japan’s top 20 export destinations from the 1910s through the 1930s. (For details, see
Appendix 3.)
3. To change nominal figures into real terms, wholesale price indexes are used for the United States and Japan, 
and retail price indexes are used for India and Korea.  As the figures for 1912–13 and 1915–20 are unavailable,
linear interpolations are made for the retail price index for India.
4. For the world, the figures are aggregated with export value-based weights for the United States, Canada, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Australia, India, the Dutch
Indies (Indonesia), Taiwan, and Korea, for which real GDP figures are continuously available, and which were
among Japan’s top 20 export destinations from the 1910s through the 1930s. (For details, see Appendix 3.)
5. Securities and business investments. On a gross basis. Changed into real terms with the wholesale price index 
of Japan.
6. “One” for 1914–18; and “zero” for the other years.
7. “*” of t-statistic means significant at the 5 percent level of significance ; “**” means significant at the 1 percent
level of significance.
8. The number of samples is 24 for the world, 26 for the United States, India, and Korea (1) and (2), and 25 for 
Korea (3).
9. For the method for calculating real export figures, see Appendix 3.
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters (annual editions); Government-General of Korea,
Statistical Yearbook of the Government-General of Korea (annual editions); Ohkawa et al. (1967); Yamazawa and
Yamamoto (1978); Japan Statistical Association (1988); Yukizawa and Maeda (1978); Mizoguchi, Toshiyuki, and
Mataji Umemura, Kyu-Nihon Shokuminchi Keizai Tokei: Suikei to Bunseki (Basic Economic Statistics of Former
Japanese Colonies 1895–1938: Estimates and Findings), 1988; Madison (2000); Mitchell (1998, 2001a, 2001b);
U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1990; Board of the Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1943.
be significant.
46 In addition, in order to avoid serial correlation, lagged dependent
variables are added as explanatory variables. As a result, the lagged dependent 
variables and real GDP prove to be significant.
47
In the above estimated results, the coefficients of the factors in the export 
function vary from destination to destination. This may reflect the fact that different
46. When the real exchange rates of the current and previous terms are added as explanatory variables, the coefficient
of exchange rates for the previous term proves significant, while that of real direct investments from Japan 
is insignificant.
47. When the explanatory variables are lagged dependent variables, real GDP, and real direct investments, the 
coefficient of real direct investments from Japan is insignificant, and the coefficient sign turns out negative.
When direct investments for the previous term are made an explanatory variable, replacing those for the currentsets of items were exported to each destination.
48 Major items for the United States
were silk products, primarily raw silk used as intermediate materials for luxury 
clothing, for which demand may have been dependent on American domestic
incomes rather than price factors. The estimated results here are consistent with the
results of the analyses conducted by Sato (1978), concluding that the absolute values
of income elasticity of demands for silk products are greater than the absolute values
of price elasticity.
49 Next, real exports to India increased significantly after 1932
(Figure 14), which may have been due to the decline in real exchange rates after
1931. As exports to India primarily consisted of cotton products,
50 it may be possible
to surmise that the exports of cotton product were easily promoted by exchange 
rate declines. As for Korea, local income factors played an important role. Export
increases in the 1930s may reflect the fact that economic growth in Korea was 
accelerated partly as a result of enhanced industrialization policies for colonies.
Supposing different sets of factors affected exports by item and by destination, the
factors affecting the entire export growth for different time periods may also have
been different. Chronologically reviewed, the export growth in the second period
(1932–34) was supported by cotton products. As already observed with regard to
India, the price elasticity of cotton exports appears to be great, and exchange rate
depreciation may have been the major factor in boosting exports in this period.
51
In particular, the depreciation of the yen against the currencies of the United
Kingdom, a major competitor, and of British colonies, major export destinations,
may have worked favorably for export competition. The decline against the pound
sterling (Figure 2) may have had strong effects on Japanese competitiveness, since
some British colonies pegged their currency to the British pound. Furthermore, as
the previous literature reveals, labor productivity as measured by total labor input
greatly improved from the 1920s through the 1930s in the cotton industry, and 
wage levels were reduced continuously for several years in the 1930s. These factors
may have restrained increases or induced decreases in yen-denominated export prices, 
possibly contributing to expanding exports. It may thus be necessary to somewhat
underestimate the effects of the declines in exchange rates.
52,53
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term, the coefficient sign turns out to be positive, but the coefficient is insignificant (Durbin’s h statistics for the
respective estimations are 0.98 and –0.53). Furthermore, when lagged dependent variables, real exchange rates for
the previous and current terms, and real GDP are made explanatory variables, the coefficient sign of the real
exchange rates turns out to be negative, but the coefficient is insignificant (the Durbin’s h statistic is –0.07).
48. Strictly speaking, analyses must be broken down into regions and items in order to prove this point directly.
49. It should be noted that while Sato (1978) analyzes the price elasticity of each item’s demand, the elasticity 
available in the analysis of this paper is acquired through the entire exports from Japan to the United States and
real exchange rates.
50. The Yukizawa/Maeda statistics indicate that about 60–70 percent of exports to “other Southeast Asian countries,”
including India in 1925 and 1935, were textile products, about 50–60 percent of which were cotton fabrics.
51. The magnitude of elasticity here is the average for the estimation period. It should be noted that the elasticity
may have changed during different time periods.
52. As some researchers point out, in addition to price factors, systematic market research and efforts to gain access to
the market may have influenced export expansions in the cotton industry during this period. For example,
Hashimoto (1984) notes that the “highly systematized cotton industry operations of Japan” shown in overseas
markets were one of the most important factors for export expansion. These operations included research 
conducted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry via overseas establishments, the deployment of overseas sales
networks by trading firms, and collaborations between trading firms and spinning companies.
53. The company history of Kurashiki Boseki Kabushiki Gaisha (1953) emphasizes that enhanced productivity and
improved quality contributed significantly to increased exports: “During the repeal of the gold embargo, fromFinally, exports for colonies and semi-colonies, which supported exports in the
third period (1935–36) and played a major role in enhancing exports during the
fourth period (1937–), may have reflected accelerating economic growth due to
enhanced colonial policies for these regions. In this case, it may be possible to surmise
that colonial policies greatly influenced export expansion during these periods.
54
IV. Concluding Remarks
The analyses performed in this paper so far indicate that the significant decline in
exchange rates after the end of 1931 may have contributed to increasing exports to
India in the second period (1932–34), but may not have significantly affected
exports to the United States during the same period. The results of these analyses
appear to suggest the possibility that the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on
exports may vary in each industrial sector. Further studies are needed to clarify the
causes of these differences. This section will suggest specific points to be covered in
future studies.
Certain conditions should be met when export quantities are raised by exchange
rate declines. First, it will be necessary for declines of sales prices in local currencies 
to stimulate demand for export items; in other words, for the price elasticity of
demands to take sufficiently negative values. At the same time, it will also be a 
prerequisite condition that sales prices denominated in local currencies decrease 
when exchange rates decline. In other words, the exchange rate pass-through ratio
must be sufficiently high. 
For the cotton fabrics and raw silk discussed in this paper, their price elasticities 
of demand in overseas markets were different, according to the previous literature.
The results of the analyses conducted in this paper are consistent with these results.
The difference between cotton fabric and raw silk in terms of price elasticity 
may have been caused by product characteristics and competitive conditions in 
each market. For example, the competitive environments for raw silk and cotton 
fabrics differed significantly. At that time, Japanese silk exports accounted for over 
90 percent of the entire imported raw silk in the United States, which may be viewed
as a noncompetitive market. However, for cotton fabric, as reviewed in Section II, 
the markets were competitive. How these factors affected the differences in price 
elasticity for each item, and how exchange rate depreciation contributed to increasing
export quantities, may need to be examined to explain differences in the effects of
exchange rate development on exports to each destination.
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January 1930 to the end of 1931, we devoted our efforts to cutting production costs and improving product
quality. As a result, we succeeded in producing high-quality, low-priced cotton products. In addition, due to the
sudden declines in the exchange rates stated earlier, external prices for our cotton products became extremely
cheap. Thus, our competitiveness against overseas products in export markets was enhanced, leading to dramatic
increases in exports in and after 1932.”
54. When the yen depreciates against the currencies of trading partners, prices of Japanese products denominated in
the currencies of those partners decrease in comparison to locally produced products, and the prices of Japanese
products decrease in comparison to those of third-party countries exporting the same products to those trading
partners. Export quantities increase through these two channels. As for colonies and semi-colonies using the yen
or currencies based on the yen, only the latter channel worked to raise exports to these regions.If there were differences in exchange rate pass-through ratios for each item, 
these various ratios may have led to the differences in the effect of exchange rate
developments on each export item. Table 3 indicates developments in export unit
prices of raw silk and cotton fabrics in the early 1930s. In the 1932 figures, while the
yen-denominated export prices for cotton fabrics leveled off or declined slightly, the
yen-denominated export prices for raw silk increased; that is, the degree of decline in
foreign currency-denominated export prices was different.
55 In the case of the raw silk
industry during the 1930s, the degree of decline in sales prices of export goods in
local currencies was less than the degree of depreciation in exchange rates due to the
increase in the yen-denominated price.
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Table 3  Export Prices of Major Textile Products
[For reference]
Raw silk  Cotton cloth  Bleached cotton cloth  Domestic product price
(17 denier, white cocoon yarn) (cotton sheeting) (cotton shirting: wider than 34) Cotton fabric, Cotton fabric,
Year on year, Yen/  Year on year, Yen/ Year on year,
cotton sheeting cotton shirting
Yen/100 kin percentage 1,000 sq. yards percentage 1,000 sq. yards percentage Year on year, Year on year,
(unit price) change (unit price) change (unit price) change percentage percentage 
change change
1931 655.32 –28.0 129.13 –29.9 134.00  n.a. n.a. –14.4
1932 708.70 8.1 121.58  –5.8  134.16 0.1  33.5 13.8
1933 813.55 14.8 160.73 32.2  166.65  24.2  16.0 23.3
Note: Domestic product prices are based on the price indexes of manufactured goods in LTES 8.
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Annual Returns of Foreign Trade of Japan (annual editions); Ohkawa et al. (1967).
If the exchange rate pass-through to the export price is too low, changes in
exchange rates may not affect export quantities. Ogawa (1992) refers to the phenom-
enon of limited effects of exchange rate fluctuations on sales prices in a local currency
as the “imperfect pass-through effect,” citing two causes for this phenomenon. The
first cause is changes in marginal costs derived from price development of imported
raw materials. Exchange rate developments affect not only export prices, but import
prices. When exchange rates decline, marginal costs may increase due to appreciation
of imported raw material prices. In this case, the extent of the decline in sales prices
denominated in a local currency is less than the extent of the exchange rate decline.
Second, the imperfect pass-through effect may arise from the pricing behavior of
export firms. If firms apply price-discrimination across export destinations, they may
not pass-through exchange rate changes to export prices perfectly in some markets,
but change markups, sales price over marginal cost, and set prices to absorb part of
the exchange rate fluctuations.
56
55. While the export quantity of cotton fabrics in 1932 exceeded the previous year’s level by 44 percent, that of raw
silk dipped 2 percent below the previous year’s level.
56. After the Plaza Accord in 1985, a sharp appreciation of the yen took place in the latter half of the 1980s,
although it did take a certain period of time for the changes in exchange rates to affect export quantities. A series
of analyses conducted in the late 1980s and the early 1990s reveal that the pricing behavior of export firms can
have a significant impact on the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on exports. Pricing behaviors that may ham-
per the effects of exchange rate declines on exports are known as pricing-to-market (PTM). For an overview of
PTM, see Ogawa (1992). Baba (1995) examines the causes of price differences between domestic and overseas
markets through empirical analyses of markup pricing of contemporary Japanese companies, while Otani (2001) 
introduces new open-economy macroeconomics that integrate the concept of PTM.When imperfect pass-through effects appear, the extent of change in relative
prices of tradable goods will be less than the extent of change in exchange rates. As a
result, the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on the economy differ from those 
in the case of exchange rate fluctuations passed through perfectly to sales prices
denominated in foreign currencies.
As observed earlier, it appears that exchange rate pass-through was almost perfect
in the cotton industry in 1932. The backgrounds of these circumstances require 
further examination. Specifically, potential areas of research include the effects 
of increasing prices of imported raw materials (e.g., raw cotton) caused by the 
depreciation of the yen,
57 declining wage levels, improved labor productivity based on
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57. Previous studies analyzing the effects of exchange rate declines on exports regard the effects of increasing prices 
of import items as an important issue to be examined. Sato (1981) discusses the effect of increases in imported
raw material prices. Cotton products, which became major export items in and after the 1920s, required imports
of raw cotton, the price for which increased due to exchange rate declines, which in turn led to increases in 
yen-denominated export prices. Sato (1981) therefore concludes that the relative price reduction effects of 
the export products due to exchange rate declines were partly counterbalanced. Okura and Teranishi (1994) 
conduct empirical analyses on the effects of changes in relative import prices on manufacturing prices and export
prices, concluding that a “one percent increase in relative import prices will increase relative export prices by 
0.83 percent.” 
Iwami, Okazaki, and Yoshikawa (1998), point out that the effects of increasing raw material prices caused 
by exchange rate decline on export prices were insignificant at that time as raw material prices decreased 
internationally in the midst of the Great Depression.
Actual yen-denominated import prices peaked in 1928, fell by around 40 percent until 1931, and then rose in
1932, when the prices of all products increased by about 20 percent and those of textile raw materials rose 
by nearly 25 percent (see figure below). At the same time, even though the international commodity market for
textile materials shrank, the degree of reduction in cotton prices was less severe in 1931–32 than in 1929–31, and
this seems insufficient to counter the effects of the declining exchange rates on import cotton prices (see table
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Sources: Ohkawa et al. (1967); Ono, Fujino, and Fujino (1979).
technological innovations and capital investments, and production increases partly
caused by enhanced exports (Figure 16). Furthermore, significant increases can be
observed in domestic cotton prices during the same period (Table 3), presenting 
significant divergence between domestic prices and export prices. This point also
requires further study.APPENDIX 1: DIFFERENCES IN COLONIES AND SEMI-COLONIES
IN TERMS OF LEGAL STATUS AND ECONOMIC 
SYSTEMS 
As Japan’s colonies and semi-colonies expanded from the 1890s through the 1940s,
the diversity of their legal positions and their changes over time became significant.
Their economic systems also differed in terms of time and place. These differences
should be carefully noted when conducting economic analyses. Based on Yamazawa
and Yamamoto (1978) and Yamamoto (1989), this section reviews differences in
colonies and semi-colonies in terms of legal status and economic systems, pointing
out noteworthy issues when analyzing trades with these regions.
According to Yamamoto (1989), the Japanese Empire as of 1937 was composed 
of a “mainland” and “overseas territories” when the war in China erupted. Legally
speaking, the “mainland” was an area in which the same legal system applied, 
comprised of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, Hokkaido, the Chishima islands, the
Okinawa islands, the Ogasawara islands, and small nearby islands. The “overseas 
territories” were those in which Japanese sovereignty was exclusively applied, and 
had unique legal systems specific to each region. These territories comprised Korea,
Taiwan, South Karafuto (the southern part of Sakhalin), Kwantung Province, and 
the South Sea Islands. Of these, Korea, Taiwan, and South Karafuto were Japanese-
dependent territories; Kwantung Province was a leased territory from China; and the
South Sea Islands were trust territories from the League of Nations. In addition, the
Japanese Empire had “‘Manchukuo’ on its periphery as a satellite nation under its
own power” (Yamamoto [1989]).
58
In an analysis of trade between Japan and these regions, determining the scope of
imports and exports can be controversial. In prewar trade statistics, South Karafuto
was regarded as part of the mainland. Korea and Taiwan were not included in 
trade statistics; however, data on trade between these regions and the mainland 
were available as “transfers” in different sets of statistics.
59 Kwantung Province and 
the South Sea Islands, meanwhile, were consistently treated as foreign locations, and
trade statistics with these regions are available. In trade statistics estimated after the
Second World War, all trade with regions other than the mainland has been treated as
external trade.
60 Considering these characteristics, Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978)
comment that “colonial trade was positioned as intermediary, between transactions
within the mainland and external transactions. It will thus be preferable to analyze
trades separately by trade destination.”
In an analysis of trade with colonies and semi-colonies, it will be necessary to 
pay attention to currencies and tariff systems. First of all, the Japanese yen was
treated as legal tender in South Karafuto and the South Sea Islands. In Korea 
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58. In addition to Manchuria, Japan expanded its military and economic influence over other northern areas of
China in the latter half of the 1930s.
59. Trade statistics estimated after the Second World War utilize the figures of these transfers to calculate trade 
figures with Korea and Taiwan.
60. However, South Karafuto, for which the figures of transfers with Japan are not available, is frequently treated as
part of the mainland. For more on this point, see Yamamoto (1989).and Taiwan, local currencies issued by the Bank of Chosen (Korea) and the Bank of
Taiwan, respectively, were treated as legal tender (both currencies were referred to as
“yen”). As these currencies were guaranteed to have equal exchange rates with the
Japanese yen, the economic effects of their use can be regarded as almost identical 
to use of the Japanese yen. On the other hand, in “Manchukuo,” the local 
currency of yuan was issued and circulated by the Manchurian Central Bank. This
currency, from its inception, was linked to silver, while the Japanese yen was 
pegged to gold. Thus, relative price movements between gold and silver led to 
corresponding fluctuations between the Manchurian yuan and Japanese yen. Then,
in 1935 the Manchurian currency was pegged to the Japanese yen. Given this 
linkage, it is common to include “Manchukuo” when referring to the “yen bloc.” 
In Kwantung Province, although the Bank of Chosen notes were treated as legal 
tender, currencies belonging to Manchuria and China also circulated, making the
region in effect a multi-currency area.
As for tariffs, trade between the mainland, South Karafuto, Taiwan, Korea, and
the South Sea Islands was tariff-exempted. However, being a colony of Japan did 
not necessarily mean tariff exemption. In the case of Taiwan, which was colonized 
in 1895, tariff exemption was not established until 1911; in the case of Korea, 
which was colonized in 1910, the exemption was established in 1920. As for
“Manchukuo,” tax exemption measures were established shortly after the creation of
the Japan-Manchuria currency link.
61
As noted above, to conduct economic analyses of Japanese colonies and the like
from the 1890s through the 1940s, it will be necessary to note the differences among
respective regions in legal and economic systems. Complex transitions in systems at
different time periods also need to be considered. It is common to treat colonies and
semi-colonies inclusively in the previous literature.
APPENDIX 2: TRADE RESTRICTIONS FROM THE 1920s
THROUGH THE 1930s
From the 1920s through the 1930s, trade restrictions had spread internationally in
the forms of tariffs and import quotas. Tariff enhancements were widely imple-
mented to protect domestic businesses in the 1920s. Against these protectionist
moves, international efforts were made to modify them, including efforts such as
those at the international conference held in 1927 by the League of Nations. In the
late 1920s, the European economy recovered from the postwar turmoil, and prices of
major products remained relatively stable. Under these economic circumstances, “the
process of the abolishment of trade restrictions indicated a certain degree of progress”
(Bank for International Settlements [1980]). 
However, after the emergence of the Great Depression in 1929, trade restrictions
spread again globally. First, in the United States, in response to pressure from 
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61. The introduction of the tariff exemption was delayed in order to secure governmental revenues for “Manchukuo”
(Yamamoto [1989]).agricultural and certain light industrial sectors, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley
Act in 1930, primarily designed to raise tariffs for products in both sectors.
62 Similar
policies were also applied in other major countries.
For example, in the United Kingdom, the principle of free trade was maintained
in the 1920s and tariff rates were kept lower than in other industrialized countries.
However, the United Kingdom adopted the General Tariff in 1932. As a result, 
tariff levels of major countries rose relative to prewar levels in the 1930s (Appendix
Table 1).
63,64
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62. For details of the circumstances under which the Smoot-Hawley Act was established and its economic impact, see
Eichengreen (1986).
63. According to Crafts (2000), prior to the First World War, there had been no import items on which a non-tariff
barrier had been imposed by major industrialized countries. However, in the 1930s, the proportion of items on
which non-tariff barriers were imposed by Germany and Italy was 100 percent, that by the United Kingdom was
8 percent, and that by the United States was 5 percent (Appendix Table 1).
64. In Japan, major tariff reform was implemented in 1926 to raise tariffs on heavy industrial and chemical products.
Furthermore, in 1927, 1929, 1931, 1932, and 1936, tariffs on sugar/starch, wood, rayon, pig iron, and other
heavy industrial products were raised, respectively.
Appendix Table 1  Barriers to Trade: Average Tariff on Manufactures 
and Import Coverage of Non-Tariff Barriers
Percent
1875 1913 1930s 1950
Tariffs
France 12–15 20 30 18
Germany 4–61 7 2 12 6
Italy 08–10 18 46 25
Spain 15–20 41 63
United States 0 0 17 23






United States 0 8
United Kingdom 0 5
Source: Crafts (2000).
The depreciation of the yen and the drastic export expansion of Japan took place
under this unfavorable trade environment, and trade restrictions against Japanese
products, especially cotton fabrics, by the United Kingdom and its colonies increased
after 1932. APPENDIX 3: THE DATA FOR ESTIMATING EXPORT FUNCTIONS
A. Real Effective Exchange Rate
The real effective exchange rates used in this paper for estimating export functions
are compiled from Japanese exchange rates against nine regions. These regions are 
the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
India, Taiwan, and Korea, for which nominal exchange rates and price index data are
continuously available, and which were among Japan’s top 20 export destinations in
the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s.
65 For both Taiwan and Korea, the nominal exchange
rate against the Japanese yen is set at a constant one to one.
Weights are calculated by a kind of chain weight method with export values for
the base year set every 10 years, in accordance with the calculation method for export
price indexes in the LTES 14. More specifically, for the 1910s, the average export
value from 1912–13 is used for the weighting; for the 1920s, the average from
1924–26, and for the 1930s, the average from 1934–36 are used, respectively.
Since the number of countries and regions in which exchange rate figures are 
available is limited, the weights for Taiwan and Korea (in which the nominal exchange
rate against the Japanese yen was constant) are higher than the actual export weights
for these regions. It is thus necessary to note the possibility that the effects of nominal
exchange rate fluctuations may be underestimated in the figures adopted here.
B. Real GDP for the World
World real GDP figures are compiled by aggregating the GDP data for regions from
which real GDP data are continuously available and which were among Japan’s top
20 export destinations in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s. As in the case of real effective
exchange rates, weights are calculated by a kind of chain weight method with the
annual export value for the base year established every 10 years. For the 1910s, 
the regions of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, India, the Dutch Indies (Indonesia), Taiwan, and Korea are
selected; for the 1920s, 11 regions comprising those selected for the 1910s, but
excluding the Netherlands and including Australia are selected; and for the 1930s, 13
regions comprising those selected for the 1910s, but excluding Canada and Italy and
including Belgium, Sweden, Norway, and Australia are selected.
66,67
C. Export Price Index for Each Destination
Export price indexes for different countries or regions are compiled from the “Export
Price Indexes Classified by Industry” available in table 5 in the LTES 14 for all 
sectors except textiles. For textiles, the export price index is compiled from the export
unit value or export price index of major items. These classified indexes for each
industrial sector are assigned weights based on export values available in Yukizawa/
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65. The coverage of the exports to these nine regions in terms of the export value against the entire exports (excluding
China and Manchuria) is 66 percent, as an average for the period 1934–36.
66. As for Sweden and Norway, only a sum of export figures is available in the Reference Book of Financial Matters.
The weights of both countries are thus assumed to be the same.
67. The coverage of exports to these regions against the total exports (excluding China and Manchuria) in terms of
export value is 86 percent for the 1910s, 87 percent for the 1920s, and 76 percent for the 1930s.Maeda statistics for each destination, and are then integrated as an export price index
for each destination. They are compiled by a kind of chain weight method as in the
case of export price indexes in the LTES. Weights for each decade are the export
value of a certain year for each export destination: 1912 for the 1910s, 1925 for the
1920s, and 1935 for the 1930s. As the number of sectors in the LTES is larger than
that of the Yukizawa/Maeda statistics, the following adjustments have been made. 
For “wooden products,” “miscellaneous products,” “ceramics,” and “forest products”
in the LTES, the weight for “other light industry items” in the Yukizawa/Maeda 
statistics is quartered. For “process foods,” “agricultural products,” and “marine 
products” in the LTES, the weight for “foodstuffs” in the Yukizawa/Maeda statistics 
is divided into thirds. 
As mentioned above, in estimates of the export price index for each export 
destination, an adjusted index is used for textiles to reflect differences in export item
structures for each destination. If there are significant differences in the export item
structures for different export destinations, an estimate of export prices using 
classified export prices designed for overall global exports, such as those in the LTES,
may cause significant divergence between the actual export prices and the estimates.
As noted previously, in the interwar period, specific export items were exported to
specific destinations, and the export prices of major items fluctuated in different 
patterns. Under these conditions, it may not be appropriate to estimate export prices
for different destinations using the classified export prices designed for overall exports.
During the interwar period, textiles accounted for the major part of exports to
any country or region.
68 However, detailed export item structures for each destination
were significantly different. The major export items for the regions, which are the 
subjects of empirical analysis in this paper, are as follows: raw silk for the United
States; cotton yarns and fabrics for India; and cotton yarns and fabrics, and in the
1930s, textile materials such as whipped and ginned cotton, for Korea. As the export
price trends of raw silk and cotton products were different from the 1910s through
the 1930s, the export prices of textile products might have moved differently for 
different countries and regions. Against this background, export price indexes for the
textile industry for each destination are estimated in this paper. 
First, export price indexes for major textile export items, such as raw silk, cotton
yarns, cotton fabrics, and whipped and ginned cotton for Korea, are compiled from
either the export price index available in the LTES or the export unit value derived
from trade statistics. Export unit value for raw silk, cotton yarns, and whipped and
ginned cotton have been calculated by dividing export values by export quantities.
69,70
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68. According to the Yukizawa/Maeda statistics, the proportion of textiles to total export values in 1925 was 
92 percent for the United States, 74 percent for “other Southeast Asian countries” including India, and 
41 percent for Korea.
69. The export values and quantities of total raw silk and cotton yarns as listed in the Historical Statistics of Japan,
Volume 3, are used here. The export values and quantities of whipped and ginned cotton exported from the
mainland Japan to Korea are obtained from the Statistical Yearbook of the Government-General of Korea.
70. Figures for whipped and ginned cotton for Korea are only available from 1926. According to the Yukizawa/ 
Maeda statistics, the exports of textile materials to Korea were small in scale until the mid-1920s. Price fluc-
tuations for whipped and ginned cotton, therefore, are only incorporated into the export price index for 1930
and thereafter.As for cotton and silk fabrics, export price indexes for each item are compiled from
data in the LTES 8. For cotton fabrics, indexes of gray cloths, bleached cloths, drill,
jean, and satin are integrated into a cotton fabric export price index with the weights
given in the LTES 14.
71 For silk fabrics, data for habutae silk and crape are used to
compile the silk fabric export price index. Then, export price indexes for raw silk,
cotton yarns, whipped cotton, ginned cotton, cotton fabrics, silk fabrics, and textile
export price indexes from the LTES 14 for other items are aggregated as a textile
export price index for each region. The weights used here are export values for each
item in 1912, 1925, and 1935, acquired from the Yukizawa/Maeda statistics.
72
Based on trends in textile export prices for different destinations, as estimated 
in the above method, trends for India and Korea seem similar, but textile export
prices for the United States behave differently (Appendix Figure 1). This is because
the export price trends for the United States were primarily affected by the price 
fluctuations of raw silk, while those for India and Korea were chiefly influenced by
the price fluctuations of cotton products. The fluctuations of export price indexes for
textiles in the LTES may be regarded as a composite of the price fluctuations of raw
silk and cotton products, indicating divergence from the indexes for all three regions.
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71. Prior to 1921, the price indexes of cotton fabrics are available only for gray cloth, bleached cloths, and drill, and
the indexes compiled from these three items are linked to those from the five items after 1921.
72. The weights of raw silk, cotton yarns, whipped cotton, ginned cotton, cotton fabrics, and silk fabrics in textile
exports for each destination fluctuate over time, but can be averaged as follows: above 90 percent for the United
States; from 60 percent to slightly over 80 percent for India; and from about 50 percent to about 70 percent 
for Korea.
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Note: Chain weights adjusted every 10 years.
Sources: Ohkawa et al. (1967); Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978); Japan Statistical
Association (1988); Government-General of Korea, Statistical Yearbook 
of the Government-General of Korea (annual editions); Yukizawa and
Maeda (1978).Based on the above considerations, this paper utilizes export price indexes for 
different destinations that have been derived from adjustments of textile products
with export prices of major product items.
The following issues must be taken into consideration. First, although adjust-
ments have been targeted only for textile products with the heaviest weights in this
analysis, the other classified indexes can be further refined by itemized export prices.
Second, except for whipped and ginned cotton for Korea, itemized export prices for
global export have been utilized. However, if the same products had different export
prices for different countries or regions, such differences cannot be reflected in this
estimation method.
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Appendix Figure 2  Export Price Indexes for Different Destinations 
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Note: Fixed weights calculated with average export values from 1934 to 1936.
Sources: Ohkawa et al. (1967); Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978); Japan Statistical
Association (1988); Government-General of Korea, Statistical Yearbook 
of the Government-General of Korea (annual editions); Yukizawa and
Maeda (1978).
The effect of the adjustment mentioned above is obvious when comparing trends
in export price indexes of overall exports for each destination before and after adjust-
ment. Prior to adjustment, export price indexes for the United States and India move
in a quite similar manner (Appendix Figure 2). Specifically, in the 1930s, their trends
appear quite similar, as does that of Korea. By contrast, after the adjustment, price
indexes for the United States behave differently from the other two regions, while the
fluctuations in India and Korea appear similar (Appendix Figure 3).177
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Appendix Figure 3  Export Price Indexes for Different Destinations 
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Note: Fixed weights calculated with average export values from 1934 to 1936.
Sources: Ohkawa et al. (1967); Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978); Japan Statistical
Association (1988); Government-General of Korea, Statistical Yearbook 
of the Government-General of Korea (annual editions); Yukizawa and
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